Statement by the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster I: Nuclear disarmament), New York, 2 May 2025

Mr. Chair,

We have to note with regret that as we are drawing closer to the completion of the current NPT review cycle, we observe no indications that the NPT forum is to overcome the deep contradictions concerning the nuclear disarmament pillar of the Treaty. Alongside with that, we experience considerable negative impact of the current atmosphere of high tension and conflict in the international affairs, which makes an increasing number of States feel dissatisfied with the regional and global security situation, as well as the level of their own protection. Differing significantly in both their national circumstances and their perceptions of the causes that have provoked the current deplorable situation, countries often come to diametrically opposite conclusions and have diametrically opposite ambitions as regards their national priorities at multilateral fora, including the NPT. As a result, the States parties' basic disagreements on practical disarmament matters are additionally exacerbated by their fundamental ideological and conceptual contradictions concerning approaches to the maintenance of international security and stability.

This only confirms once again that however strong the desire to disregard global developments while discussing disarmament matters might be, it is absolutely pointless to attempt to elaborate possible practical measures in this sphere without taking into account the politico-military and strategic context. No initiatives, not to mention ambitious concepts in this sphere, should ignore the realities of the given historical moment, otherwise they will be doomed to remain in the archives of projects never to be implemented.

The disarmament undertakings that are to contribute to the promotion of the relevant NPT objectives in practice, should be based both on a realistic perception of the international security environment, and on elements that either have been generally agreed upon or can be mutually acceptable. In other words, they would naturally build on the integrated approach to disarmament aiming to maintain the balance of interests of all parties to the Treaty. They would also involve renunciation of attempts to imperiously and unconditionally enforce one's view as the only correct one in order to put it down in the review process documents, which can only reinforce the trend towards the failure to adopt consensus decisions at the review cycle meetings, and consequently should be prevented.

We firmly believe that this is a reasoned and pragmatic way of looking at things and that essentially it has no alternative. Its imperative was fully recognized by our predecessors, who were guided by it in practice since the first attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons across the world. Corresponding logical connections and common understandings were embodied in the NPT Preamble and Article VI and reflected in the consensus-based decisions of the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. We will relentlessly continue to remind everyone of this. That is what has enabled the NPT to withstand the test of time and to continue functioning and serving its purpose despite all doubts expressed as to its credibility.

Russia is committed to reaching a nuclear-weapon-free and safer world for all as the ultimate goal of the nuclear disarmament process integrally linked to the general and complete disarmament as envisaged by the Treaty provisions and the related collectively approved documents. We believe that this comprehensive approach should be implemented holistically allowing none of its components to be disregarded for the benefit of others. Any real progress on this path may be achieved only through measured and step-by-step actions affecting no one's security and strengthening global stability, peace and security.

We continue to view the NPT as the international legal framework and underpinning for the efforts in this direction, however difficult this path might be. We believe that any ideas of a 'short cut' to 'nuclear zero' through immediate and unconditional renunciation and outlawing of nuclear weapons are unworkable and counter-productive. So are any attempts to set artificial deadlines for disarmament, especially in the current highly turbulent and unpredictable international environment. Such ideas fail to take into account the politico-military and strategic realities, disregard the security interests of nuclear-weapon States, run counter to the principle of undiminished security and are set outside the context of general and complete disarmament. Attempts to push forward such non-consensus initiatives only exacerbate the contradictions at the NPT forum, which would be detrimental to the sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Such factor as nuclear deterrence cannot be removed from the international security system at someone's whim without offering an alternative reliable and effective means of ensuring long-term stability. At the same time, as long as the nuclear deterrence is kept, it is of vital importance that all the nuclear-weapon States that pursue it should remain fully committed to the tenet that a nuclear war must never be fought. To this end, all nuclear powers should prevent not just in word, but in deed, any military confrontation between them. This would in its turn require them to renounce all hostile actions infringing core security interests of other parties and inevitably increasing strategic risks.

As nuclear disarmament process, just like nuclear arms control, cannot exist outside the context of international security situation and the state of the relations between nuclear-weapon States, to achieve any progress on these tracks, corresponding military and political prerequisites should be met. To create such a favourable climate, one should first and foremost eliminate the root causes of fundamental security contradictions that can lead the nuclear powers to a direct military standoff. In particular, Western countries would need to abandon their destructive anti-Russian course and the attendant attempts to inflict strategic defeat on Russia and continue the malicious expansion of the hostile NATO bloc to our borders.

There is another major obstacle to any further nuclear arms reductions, which is posed by certain nuclear powers' and their allies' seriously destabilizing steps aimed at securing themselves overwhelming military superiority and subsequently even 'strategic invulnerability'. We have discussed the negative influence of the relevant concepts and technical military programmes in detail in the earlier joint statement by the Russian and Belarusian delegations on behalf of States Parties to the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State of Belarus and Russia.

The process of nuclear disarmament requires the engagement of all States possessing military nuclear capabilities. What is more, for all the elements of the NPT Article VI to be implemented in their entirety, active involvement of all countries will be necessary, including non-nuclear-weapon States, especially those under nuclear umbrella. They should also make a meaningful contribution to improving the international environment and achieving the Treaty's disarmament objectives.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.