Statement by the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issues of transparency, reporting and accountability), New York, 7 May 2025

Mr. Chair,

We would like to note the following in connection with initiatives aimed at enhancing transparency, reporting and accountability of the nuclear-weapon States.

Russia regularly and within admissible limits informs the international community of its national nuclear policy at the relevant international fora. In particular, Russia, like other nuclear-weapon States, regularly submits national reports on the implementation of the NPT as part of the Treaty review process. Therefore, we cannot agree with the statements claiming that the NPT community is not duly informed.

Like other nuclear-weapon States, we prepare the reports based on the previously agreed common reporting framework, which remains relevant and, as we believe, needs no updating. We submit our report ahead of the key event that concludes the review cycle – the NPT Review Conference, and we are convinced that this is modus operandi.

We hear calls to nuclear-weapon States to exercise greater transparency with regard to their nuclear arsenals, which should allegedly build confidence between States parties. However, such transparency is neither a panacea, nor an absolute and universally applicable solution, and cannot be considered in a vacuum. It has reasonable limits and ends where objective risks for the countries' national security begin. The professionals are well aware of the fact that due to the quantitative differences between nuclear arsenals and the existing threats, mechanically enhancing transparency cannot serve as an absolute means of reducing nuclear danger. What is more, unless the interplay of the strategic stability factors is duly taken into account, steps to increase transparency in nuclear sphere can bring about an increase, rather than desired reduction, of strategic risks.

In this context, each country carefully calibrates its transparency measures depending on strategic realities in the context of ensuring its national security interests. Russia has taken and continues to take acceptable nuclear transparency measures. Their content and scope are perfectly adequate given the current international security and strategic stability environment.

We cannot accept proposals aimed at imposing unreasonable obligations regarding accountability in nuclear disarmament matters. Neither can we support any attempts to convert the NPT review process into a means of oversight and coercion.

Nevertheless, we believe that the reports on the Treaty implementation should cover all three pillars, and that such reports should be presented by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Here we primarily refer to the NATO members, which have announced their bloc to be a nuclear one, and to the participants in 'nuclear sharing' arrangements, including in the Asia-Pacific.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.