The main part of my visit to Uzbekistan has concluded.

I would like to begin by thanking our hosts, our Uzbekistani friends, for the traditionally warm and gracious reception and substantive talks, which we used to discuss the entire range of our relations, bilateral issues, and interaction in the region and internationally.

A conversation with the President of Uzbekistan, esteemed Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has just concluded. We spent more than an hour discussing the objectives arising from his meetings with President Putin. Over the past two years, the presidents have agreed on strategic areas for advancing our alliance and strategic partnership, including numerous projects worth tens of billions of dollars.

During the talks with President Mirziyoyev and Foreign Minister Saidov, we took a close look at these processes and identified additional steps to be taken by economic, financial and banking entities in order to successfully carry out the agreed objectives regardless of adverse global circumstances.

Energy is of paramount importance. The construction of the first nuclear power plant is Uzbekistan’s flagship joint project. The contract was signed a year ago, and the project will go live soon. Cooperation in the gas sector is also on the rise. A number of gas infrastructure projects are being implemented which will double gas supplies from the Russian Federation to Uzbekistan when finished.

We also discussed transport projects which will improve connectivity of our countries. Work is underway to increase the volume of railroad transport, cargo and passenger alike. Plans are in place to expand the North-South and East-West international transport corridors.

Interregional cooperation is a top priority with our leaders. The Russian-Uzbekistani interregional forum established six years ago on the initiative of President Mirziyoyev was transformed into the Council of Regions of Russia and Uzbekistan headed by the leaders of our respective countries. About 80 Russian regions maintain regular ties with the regions of Uzbekistan.

We highly praised cooperation in culture and the humanitarian sphere. In November 2024, Days of Culture of Uzbekistan were held with great success in the Russian Federation. In June 2025, our friends will host Days of Russian Culture.

Education is high on the list of our humanitarian priorities. More than 56,000 citizens of Uzbekistan study at the Russian universities. Fourteen branches of leading Russian universities operate in Uzbekistan, and the Bauman Moscow State Technical University is about to open a branch of its own in the foreseeable future. Programmes are being implemented to support the Russian language through pre-school and secondary education projects in Uzbekistan such as Class!, Little One, and The Power of Mind.

We provide unwavering support to the efforts deployed by the leadership of the Republic, and personally President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, to preserve interethnic harmony, to strengthen the position of the Russian language, which in Uzbekistan is the language of interethnic communication, the Russian cultural and historical presence, given that Uzbekistan is home to about one million of our compatriots, and the rest of the citizens of Uzbekistan, in one way or another, come into contact with the Russian language in their everyday lives. We welcome in every possible way the interest shown by President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev in promoting the Russian language. Today, we stressed the importance of completing as soon as possible the creation of the International Organisation for the Russian Language, in which Uzbekistan is actively involved.

We reviewed matters of labour migration, and ways to create safe and orderly conditions for interaction in this important sphere. We noted mutual interest in improving procedures for organised hiring of labour in Uzbekistan for work in Russia.

Our perspectives on most international and regional issues overlap or are close. We have positively assessed our interaction at the UN and other international organisations, including the CIS and the SCO, as well as within the framework of the Central Asian Five Plus Russia cooperation mechanism, mindful of the latest meeting of foreign ministers of this format that took place in Almaty on April 11. Preparations for the Russia Plus Central Asia summit in the autumn of 2025 was one of the main issues discussed during the meeting of foreign ministers.

We also touched upon prospects of interaction within BRICS. This year, Uzbekistan joined the association as a partner state. Prospects for expanding interaction across all areas look good.

Taking into account Uzbekistan’s observer status in the Eurasian Economic Union, we highly praised the development of the dialogue in this area, primarily with the EEC.

We have agreed to continue coordinating our actions, and providing each other with mutual support on multilateral platforms. This is what the 2024-2025 Programme for Cooperation between the Foreign Ministries of the two countries is designed to achieve. We are now preparing the programme for the next two years.

We reviewed a number of regional priorities, including the situation in Afghanistan and the Middle East, including the context of the Syrian developments and the importance of strengthening cooperation in combatting terrorism, drug trafficking, and organised crime. We also mentioned the undoubtedly challenging situation in the Palestinian territories, where extra efforts need to be deployed in order to address the underlying causes of the ongoing crisis, which are rooted in the lack of any progress in implementing UN decisions on establishing a Palestinian state.

The underlying causes remain the key to resolving the situation surrounding Ukraine. We have informed our Uzbekistani friends in detail about the latest developments, including in the context of our contacts with the United States and the ideas that the United States has been promoting in its work with Ukrainians and Europeans in recent days.

The situation around the Iranian nuclear programme is another matter of mutual interest. We support the efforts of Tehran and Washington as part of bilateral talks to identify ways to remove this irritant, which will strengthen stability in the Gulf region and, more broadly, in the Middle East and neighbouring regions.

We are satisfied with the outcomes of the talks. They confirmed our mutual willingness to expand our partnership and our alliance across all areas.

I invited my colleague Bakhtiyor Saidov to visit Russia at his convenience.

Question: In your assessment, how productive has this visit been in terms of expanding bilateral cooperation between foreign policy agencies and advancing the objectives of deepening partnership articulated by the leaders of both nations during high-level engagements?

Sergey Lavrov: It would be immodest for me to appraise the outcomes of my own visit. That responsibility lies with our respective leaderships.

Nevertheless, I can affirm that we are pleased with the manner in which we have been able to conduct such a detailed and comprehensive review of all facets of our collaboration, grounded in the instructions issued by the Presidents over the past two years during their regular and frequent meetings. These instructions have encompassed nearly the entirety of our agenda and established objectives across all issues, whose resolution will not only broaden and deepen our cooperation but, crucially, will also contribute to the social and economic development of Uzbekistan and Russia, the creation of new employment opportunities, and the enhancement of our citizens’ prosperity.

Our partnership spans virtually the full spectrum of economic, cultural, and innovative engagement, such as industry and energy – including nuclear energy. Preparations are now underway to construct a low-capacity nuclear power plant, while plans for a larger nuclear facility remain on the agenda. The Rosatom State Corporation possesses the requisite expertise, and our Uzbek friends duly acknowledge the capabilities of our atomic energy corporation.

In the transport sector, a new infrastructure project – the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway – has emerged. As we confirmed today, this initiative aligns seamlessly with the broader strategy to enhance connectivity across the Eurasian continent. Similarly, the Trans-Afghan railway project, which holds significant interest for Uzbekistan, will provide access to Pakistani ports and the Indian Ocean.

These efforts naturally synchronise with projects that directly involve the Russian Federation, including the International North-South Transport Corridor. The God-given potential of Eurasia – the planet’s largest continent – must be leveraged to maximum effect. All initiatives to strengthen connectivity in every sense and dimension across Eurasian space must be rooted, first and foremost, in geographical realities and pursued in a manner unimpeded by the political games of those seeking to undermine the prospects of constructive cooperation, including in the Central Asian region, which commands heightened interest from numerous states.

We also discussed spheres of education and culture, as well as advanced technologies, science, and more. Thus, the tasks set by our leaders continue to prove their relevance and demand daily attention.

Today, we agreed that the Foreign Ministries – entrusted with coordinating all external engagements in both Russia and Uzbekistan – will exchange expertise in this domain to facilitate further progress.

Question: You mentioned the Central Asia + Russia format. Genuine competition for Central Asia has now unfolded. How do you assess the efficacy of this format, particularly compared to such frameworks as Central Asia + the United States and Central Asia + the European Union?

Sergey Lavrov: I will refrain from assessing the efficacy. This is perhaps best determined by consulting our Central Asian friends themselves. It is for them to ascertain which format yields greater results.

I can only state the following. In the development of this framework, one summit has already taken place, alongside several ministerial meetings. Another summit is scheduled for October on the sidelines of the CIS summit in Dushanbe. We proceed from the premise that this interaction can be exclusively mutually beneficial and grounded in agreements satisfactory to all participants.

Another critical aspect of our stance is our unequivocal opposition to the politicisation of cooperation processes and the introduction of ideological elements tied to attempts by any group of states to establish dominance over this or other geopolitical spaces.

Regrettably, the latter type of attempts I referenced is starkly evident in the approaches of our Western colleagues towards engagement with the Central Asian “quintet.” Members of the European Union and the leadership of the European Commission in Brussels stand out in this regard, promoting agendas in the region with overt anti-Russian bias. We do not object to our allies and strategic partners pursuing multi-vector policies. We ourselves have always sought constructive arrangements across all geopolitical and geographic directions. However, certain partners of Central Asia – primarily Western ones – appear less focused on proposing reciprocal projects than on advancing their own interests, allocating funds to programmes aimed at infiltrating the state structures of Central Asian countries, including such sensitive spheres as cross-border cooperation, statistics, and customs affairs.

Naturally, this cannot meet with approval, and Central Asian states recognise this. Through our engagements with them, we know they fully comprehend the objectives pursued by Western states and are taking every measure to safeguard their sovereignty.

Incidentally, Central Asia welcomed with relief US President Donald Trump’s decision to terminate the operations of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The region has long observed that this agency, while disbursing funds, directs nearly its entire budget towards dispatching its consultants to recipient states, who embed themselves within governmental bodies. One need not elaborate on how such resources “assist” the relations of these countries with Western donors.

Thus, we advocate for liberating Central Asia’s collaborative processes with external partners from such brazen attempts – to call a spade a spade – at interference in internal affairs. We ourselves never permit such conduct with anyone.

Question: Following the Russian Supreme Court’s decision to remove the Taliban movement from the list of banned organisations, should we expect more proactive steps from Moscow regarding Afghanistan? Was joint cooperation with Uzbekistan on the Afghan track discussed, given that Uzbekistan is among the states most actively engaging with Kabul?

Sergey Lavrov: Our activity on the Afghan track has never diminished. Indeed, we have now completed all procedures required under our legislation to suspend the decision designating the Taliban as a terrorist organisation.

In practice, following the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan amid the precipitate withdrawal of the Joe Biden administration and its Western allies, we have maintained consistent engagement with the new Afghan authorities. Our Embassy in Kabul has never suspended operations, remaining fully operational and maintaining daily contact with the new leadership across all levels to address matters of mutual concern.

During this same period (immediately after the Taliban came to power), we advocated for their inclusion in multilateral frameworks established to address the Afghan issue. Specifically, the Moscow Format on Afghanistan, which is widely acknowledged as one of the most effective mechanisms. From the earliest days of the change of power in Kabul, this format has engaged representatives of the Taliban in its work. I personally met with a delegation that visited Moscow shortly after the transition of power to participate in a session of the Moscow Format. This also applies to the group of neighbouring states. It, too, undertakes highly efficient endavours as part of a coalition of countries directly bordering Afghanistan. A corresponding mechanism exists within the SCO as well, which we also actively utilise.

The synchronised and harmonised efforts of these frameworks assist the new Afghan authorities in better understanding the advice of neighbouring states, aimed at ensuring national reconciliation within Afghan society. This is crucial for the country’s further development and, most importantly, for eliminating risks of destabilisation and escalation. Should these risks be minimised, there will be far greater confidence in implementing infrastructural and other projects linking Afghanistan with Central Asia and adjacent regions, thereby advancing objectives to enhance the country’s economic viability and address social challenges.

We have noted the West’s vigorous attempts to re-enter the Afghan “game,” from which it withdrew during the coalition’s flight from the country following the Taliban’s rise to power. In particular, the West initiated a new consultative format through the UN Secretariat, convening in Doha – the Doha Format. The objective is evident: the West is discomforted by the fact that, prior to this format’s creation, regional states played the leading role in externally facilitating Afghan processes.

We do not object – provided the participation of Western countries in these collective efforts is conducted honestly and without double-dealing. Hence, we too are participating in the Doha process. Within its framework, experimental working groups have been established, including one focused on combatting drug trafficking. Thus far, we have observed no significant progress from the involvement of UN representatives and Western actors in these joint efforts. Should mutually acceptable projects emerge – primarily acceptable to the Afghan leadership –we will raise no objections.

The paramount priority is to prevent attempts to reintroduce double standards or hidden agendas here. It is impermissible to seek – and such attempts exist – to redeploy NATO military infrastructure to the region under various pretexts. Such efforts would create a new time bomb, perhaps not even a delayed one.

We maintain close contact with our Central Asian counterparts. Our positions on this matter align. None of them wishes to host elements of NATO military infrastructure. This is entirely prudent. Pakistan adheres to the same stance.

We actively advocate for the unfreezing of Afghan state reserves currently held in the United States. This is essential for resolving acute social and economic challenges facing the country and the Afghan people.

Let me reiterate: the authorities in Kabul are a reality. They must be acknowledged if one is to pursue pragmatic, non-ideological policy.

Question: During the Government Hour at the State Duma in February, you made it clear that tightening regulations governing entry into Russia for labour migrants from Central Asia is not consistent with our country’s long-term interests. Shortly before that, a certain number of illegal migrants had been deported from Russia and a controlled person register was put together. Over the past two years, a total of about 15 laws have been adopted imposing restrictions on migrants’ entry and stay in Russia. What are the Russian authorities guided by when they take such decisions?

Sergey Lavrov: If we look at the situation in its entirety, measures that will cut the number of migrant workers are scarcely in our interests.

I’m sure you are familiar with the assessments provided by our government experts and scientific community concerning demographic issues and the country’s development goals saying that labour shortages may make our plans less realistic.

The other part of the problem is the importance of complying with Russian laws and preventing criminality among migrant workers. We are aware of such instances, and we need to look for a golden mean. I discussed this in detail with President Mirziyoyev and Foreign Minister Saidov.

The point is to make sure that, before they go to the Russian Federation, migrant workers learn enough of the Russian language and Russian laws and rules of conduct for foreigners, in this particular case, rules of conduct for migrant workers.

The latest changes in our legislation are designed to strike this balance. From the standpoint of legislative procedure, the decision has been taken. Proper law enforcement practice is what matters most now. In Uzbekistan, we have found full understanding of the importance of introducing a procedure that will minimise violations. Excesses cannot be excluded altogether, especially excesses related to extremist or, even worse, terrorist activities.

The law enforcement practice to be carried out in the Russian Federation will be based primarily on the need to minimise this damage and to maximise the contribution that migrant workers (who are in great demand) can make to carrying out our socioeconomic plans.

Question: As is widely known, the United States has imposed sweeping trade tariffs on a vast number of countries, including Uzbekistan. Have you and your colleagues discussed this today? How can this situation affect Russia-Uzbekistan trade?

Sergey Lavrov: I think this situation may affect trade between Uzbekistan and the United States.

What does Russia have to do with that? Our country trades with Uzbekistan on the basis of bilateral agreements. Goods from the United States do not come to Uzbekistan via Russia. Goods from Uzbekistan do not come to America through us, either. I do not see any risks for Russia-Uzbekistan trade which relies on a number of favourable terms under the CIS free trade area and as part of Uzbekistan’s relations with the EAEU. I do not think we are threatened in any way by trade experiments conducted by Washington.

Question: When will the next round of Russia-US talks take place?

Sergey Lavrov: Soon.

Question: How do you see the role of municipalities internationally? How effective is the practice of establishing twinning relations between the cities of our country with cities internationally given the circumstances at hand?

Sergey Lavrov: The denser the fabric of interaction between countries, the more effective their relations are, the more benefits the citizens of the country in question may derive from these relations. This should be the main goal of foreign and trade policy, and foreign economic activity of any country.

We keep saying that Russia’s foreign policy - President Putin underscored this many times - is increasingly based on the involvement of our regions. Virtually all constituent entities of the Federation have extensive relations with their foreign partners, provinces, and regions of neighbouring and not just neighbouring countries. When this process graduates to the next stage, the municipal level, it only becomes stronger and relies on an increasingly solid foundation.

We encourage twinning and all kinds of contacts between municipalities which rely on relevant programmes that are increasingly being implemented in the practical activities of the SCO, BRICS, and other organisations with Russia’s involvement.

Question: When will members of the delegation to attend the funeral of Pope Francis be determined?

Sergey Lavrov: Any day now.

This is the decision to be made by President Putin. I’m sure you will know the answer to your question very soon.